Executive Summary
As of 2024, the development and effectiveness of civil society in Türkiye continues to
be shaped by the intersection of multidimensional factors ranging from economic
conditions to the political atmosphere, from the legal infrastructure to changes in
international relations. These structural elements that affect the operating
environment of CSOs play a decisive role in fundamental areas such as the exercise of
freedoms of association, expression and assembly, financial sustainability, and the
reputation and legitimacy of CSOs in the public sphere
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In 2024, the ongoing economic crisis continued to have negative effects on the
financial resilience of CSOs, which in turn affected the continuity of civil society’s
activities in various ways. The high inflation rate, shrinking civic spaces due to political
developments, and difficulties in accessing international funds have been other
prominent issues.
The results of the 2023 general elections and the March 31, 2024, local elections
significantly influenced the operational scope of civil society and in some areas
created transformative effects. The distribution of seats in the Grand National
Assembly of Türkiye (GNAT) did not result in a significant change in the functioning of
legislative activities compared to the previous term. The municipal elections,
however, brought about new opportunities for CSOs to seek cooperation with
municipalities; the preparation of strategic plans, participation in city councils and
involvement in the planning of municipal public services became significant areas for
CSO intervention. These developments required civil society to reassess its position
and adapt its activities to these new dynamics.
In an environment where restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly persist,
administrative oversight has increased particularly for CSOs operating in certain
areas, especially those working on rights-based issues and receiving resources from
abroad. Nevertheless, ongoing civil society activities at local, regional and national
levels, rights-based campaigns, public protests and events across the country
demonstrate that, despite all challenges, civic space retains its resilience and vibrancy.
While uncertainties remain in the implementation of legislation on freedom of
association, the lack of transparency particularly in audit processes has perpetuated
legal certainty problems for CSOs. The fact that CSO members and executives face
criminal investigations and prosecutions, and are publicly targeted due to their civil
society activities, narrows civic space and poses a threat to freedom of association.
One of the main legislative agendas affecting civil society in 2024 was a draft law that
expanded the scope of the crime of “espionage” by introducing a new article in the
Turkish Penal Code under the name of “Agent of Influence.”
The draft article was included in an omnibus law submitted to the Grand National
Assembly of Türkiye on October 18, 2024, and was adopted in the Justice Committee.
The regulation was criticized by human rights organizations, journalists, bar
associations, the political opposition, and local and international civil society
organizations on the grounds that it would restrict freedom of expression and civil
space. It was also emphasized that such laws are part of a global trend that have been
enacted in many countries in recent years to intervene in civil society activities.3
Following intense public reaction, the draft article was removed from the draft law on
November 13, 2024. Known as Article 339/A, the proposal envisaged prison sentences
of 3 to 7 years for individuals who commit crimes against state security or political
interests in line with the strategic interests of a foreign state or organization. It has
been noted that the proposal could have negative consequences especially for CSOs,
media outlets and academic institutions receiving foreign funds, and might come
back on the agenda of the Parliament. On the other hand, civil society organizations
continue to voice their objections.
In 2024, Türkiye was removed from the “grey list” of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) on the grounds that it had made progress in anti-money laundering and
counter financing terrorism. Although some amendments introduced by Law No.
7262 on the Prevention of Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction to the Law on Associations and the Law on Collection of Aid were annulled
by the Constitutional Court, audits of associations based on a risk assessment, whose
method and criteria are updated every year and not transparently announced to
associations, continue to be conducted.
The role of civil society in the recovery period after the February 6, 2023 earthquakes
has remained both significant and contentious. Civil society organizations, particularly
local organizations and volunteer networks, have been actively working in the region
since the early stages of the disaster; however, in 2024, many CSOs faced difficulties
to continue their activities due to challenges in accessing resources, obtaining
operational permits, and shortcomings in coordination mechanisms. The lack of
participatory, and transparent approach sensitive to social needs in the reconstruction
process in the earthquake zone has made the role of civil society visible but limited its
impact. Despite this, civil actors have continued to sustain solidarity in the region
through their rights-based and community-oriented approaches.
Türkiye remains the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world, but
this fact is increasingly being addressed with a security-based approach. In particular,
the hardening of anti-immigration rhetoric by politicians during election campaigns
has increased discrimination against migrants and incidents of mass violence.
Intensive deportation practices targeting migrants and refugees have continued, and
serious concerns have been raised about human rights violations in deportation
centers. In this environment, civil society organizations working in the field of
migration have faced increasing restrictions in terms of both their scope of activities
and access to financial resources. Most foreign funds for migration and refugee
management policies were once again directed toward border security and control
mechanisms, with insufficient support allocated for activities prioritizing refugees’
access to rights.
The 12th Development Plan (2024-2028) and the 2024 and 2025 Presidential Annual
Programs, which are the main policy documents shaping public administration’s
vision for civil society development, include the goal of a democratic, participatory,
inclusive and accountable civil society and emphasize the importance of CSO
participation in the planning, implementation and evaluation of public policies.
Although the Civil Society Strategy Document and Action Plan has not yet entered
into force, the expectations for the reform based on these documents continue.
However, throughout 2024, no concrete steps were taken towards the fulfillment of
these objectives, and no progress was made in the effective participation of civil
society in decision-making processes.
Reports published by international organizations containing data and assessments on
Türkiye in 2024, as in previous years, have drawn attention to interventions targeting
civil society. Restrictions on freedoms of expression, assembly and association, the
shrinking space for democratic participation, and the weakening of civil society actors’
strength to freely continue their activities have been the prominent themes of these
reports. These assessments reveal that Türkiye needs structural reforms and policy
changes to protect and expand civic space within its commitment to international
human rights obligations.
The European Commission’s 2024 Türkiye Report emphasized that CSOs in Türkiye
operate in a highly restrictive environment.4 According to the report, this situation
hampers the CSOs’ maneuvering space; nevertheless, CSOs continue to actively
participate in social life and contribute to various fields. It was underlined that CSOs
working on women’s, LGBTI+ and human rights are subjected to stigmatization
and discrimination. In the absence of a transparent, sufficient and streamlined public
funding mechanism, only a small number of CSOs can benefit from public support,
taxation practices hinder the functioning and development of associations and foundations, and CSOs receiving foreign resources are subjected to frequent
auditing. The report emphasized the insufficiency of consultation mechanisms to
include independent CSOs in law- and policy-making processes and stated that this
deficiency needs to be addressed in political, legal, financial and administrative
dimensions. Ensuring an inclusive environment where CSOs can work freely stands
out as a fundamental requirement for democratic governance.
The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, in her report entitled
“Memorandum on Freedom of Expression and of the Media, Human Rights Defenders
and Civil Society in Türkiye” drew attention to systematic restrictions on freedom of
expression, media independence, and pressure faced by human rights defenders and
civil society.5 The report highlighted issues such as the weakening of judicial
independence, uncertainties in the legal framework, and audit mechanisms that
obstruct CSOs’ operations. It also drew attention to criminalization of civil society,
targeting of women and LGBTI+ rights defenders, disproportionate restrictions on the
right to peaceful assembly, and prolonged detentions despite the judgements of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Constitutional Court. The
Commissioner stated that all these practices undermine the rule of law and
fundamental human rights and called on Türkiye to act in compliance with its
international obligations.
In its Global Findings 2024 Report, CIVICUS Monitor has classified Türkiye under the
category of “repressed countries” as in previous reporting periods. The report
included the draft law on “Agents of Influence” and the detention of over 200 people
in the May 1, 2024 Labor, Struggle and Solidarity Day March intervened by
disproportionate force; these examples reiterated that civic space in Türkiye is
shrinking and that fundamental rights and freedoms are being systematically
violated.
In its 2024 reporting, Freedom House classifies Türkiye, as in previous years,
under the category of “not free” with a score of 33 out of 100. The report
stated that CSOs are routinely denied access to public officials, official meetings
and events, and that many civil society groups are targeted. It particularly emphasized
that LGBTI+, women, and ethnic and religious minorities are oppressed
by legal and criminal means.
Similarly, in the Freedom on the Net 2024 report, in which Freedom House assesses
freedom of expression on the internet, Türkiye was classified as “not free” with a score of 31
out of 100.
The Human Rights Watch 2025 Türkiye report drew attention to associations and activists
being targeted due to the critical thoughts, protests being arbitrarily banned, and
organizations receiving international funding being subjected to intense audits and
pressure.9 Similarly, the Türkiye section of Amnesty International’s the State of the World’s
Human Rights Report emphasized that CSO representatives were prosecuted with
ungrounded accusations, that some CSOs were at risk of closure due to these cases, and
that their assets were seized.10 The report, which included numerous cases demonstrating
frequent violations of freedom of peaceful assembly and association, stated that this overall
picture leads to the shrinking of civic space and hinders activities aimed at the enhancing
human rights.
The World Giving Index 2024 assessed Türkiye’s performance in giving and volunteerism.
Türkiye ranked 122nd out of 142 countries, in helping a stranger (56%), in donations (22%),
and in time spent volunteering (10%). These findings indicate that individual giving and
volunteering activities in Türkiye rank the lower-middle range internationally and
demonstrating the need for broadening tax incentives and support for volunteering
activities more particularly to encourage giving and to strengthen civil society.
According to the 2024 Annual Report of the European Court of Human Rights, applications
filed against Türkiye with 21,613 applications, constituted the largest share of the total
60,350 applications before the Court, and Türkiye is the highest case-country among
46 Council of Europe member states. Of the 36,819 cases concluded in 2024, 73 concerned
Türkiye, and in 67 of these, at least one violation was found. The violation of the right to
liberty and security under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
which was found in 19 cases, was most frequently ruled among the settled cases. In addition,
it was ruled in 6 cases that the right to freedom of assembly and association under Article 11
of the Convention was violated. These figures lead to criticism of the functioning and
effectiveness of the human rights regime in Türkiye; the failure to implement ECtHR
judgments in which violations have already been found also raises questions about the rule
of law and commitment to international obligations.
In conclusion, 2024 was a year in which civil society in Türkiye demonstrated resilience even
under challenging conditions and restructured itself in some areas with new forms of
organization and participation models. In this context, the developments summarized
above provide an important basis for understanding the overall environment in which civil
society in Türkiye operates.
Key Positive Development for 2024
- Consultations conducted in 2024 to develop legislation and policies
on volunteering are a good practice for the effective participation
of civil society in decision-making processes. The Green Paper
and White Paper prepared with regard of these consultations, in line with
the recommendations of CSO representatives, propose drawing up
a general policy framework for volunteering legislation rather than
a detailed regulation. It is a positive development that these documents
do not include regulations that could have a deterrent effect, such
as compulsory volunteering agreements or registration of volunteers
in a central system. It is also emphasized that financial obligations such
as insuring volunteers should not be imposed on CSOs.
Key Negative Development for 2024
- The establishment of CSOs is highly bureaucratic and complex.
Requirements such as reaching a certain number of members, meeting
minimum endowment value, and notifying members to the Associations
Information System (DERBİS) create obstacles, especially for small-scale
and newly formed organizations. The requirement for applications in
person, difficulties in finding suitable office spaces, and implicit
prohibitions preventing office sharing with other organizations obstruct
CSOs’ work already from the establishment stage, both financially and
administratively. On the other hand, in the case of associations and
foundations that comply with standard bureaucracy and procedures and
submit applications fully, acquire legal personality within the legal
deadlines and in a predictable manner. - Associations and foundations are subject to frequent, detailed, and
sometimes disproportionate audits. The criteria used in the sectoral risk
analysis carried out to prevent money laundering and financing terrorism
(ML/TF) lead to unclear and unfair outcomes for CSOs. Rights-based and
independent associations are subject to ML/TF audits solely because they
benefit from foreign funds, regardless of their source. These detailed
audits increase the bureaucratic workload and cause disproportionate and
constant oversight of organizations’ activities. Nevertheless, CSOs with
strong institutional capacity conduct their activities in compliance with
the legislation because of their regular internal audit and reporting
systems. In cases where membership registers are kept regularly, board
decisions are archived with dates and numbers, and registers are backed
up electronically, problems encountered in audits are reduced. - Cases such as filing closure cases against associations and the sealing
of associations’ offices demonstrate that state interventions in CSOs
continue and that public administration used its power through judicial
and administrative means to restrict freedom of association. - To collect aid and fundraising CSOs must obtain permission and comply
within detailed bureaucratic procedures. The obligations imposed by
administrative authorities regarding authorization and supervision restrict
resource seeking activities, CSOs’ autonomy, and will of donors. Although
the Constitutional Court annulled some restrictive provisions in the law, no
reform has been made in overall legislation regarding aid collection in line
with freedom of association standards. - The decrease in international funds jeopardizes the sustainability
of CSOs, leading to a reduction in the number of employees. In addition,
attempts such as the “Agent of Influence” draft law lead for CSOs
receiving foreign funds to be stigmatized and their activities to be subject
to criminalization and prosecution. - There are numerous obstacles to the exercise of the right to assembly
and demonstration. The obligation of prior notification is implemented
as a requirement to obtain permission, and demonstrations are banned
on vague grounds, prevented by harsh interventions and detentions
by law enforcement, resulting in the de facto suspension of the right.
Journalists, lawyers, and human rights defenders are also affected
by these interventions. - Despite legal guarantees, legislation containing provisions concerning
freedom of expression, especially the Turkish Penal Code and the
Anti-Terror Law, restricts freedom of expression through broad and
vague grounds; critical and rights-based opinions are subjected to
criminal measures and sanctions. Journalists, academics, lawyers, human
rights defenders, and students are systematically prosecuted, detained,
and imprisoned for exercising their freedom of expression - The right to information and internet freedom are restricted by many
regulations, particularly Laws No. 4982 and No. 5651; blocking access to
websites and censorship practices are becoming more widespread,
weakening transparency and accountability. - There are no effective protection mechanisms against online and physical
attacks on CSOs and their representatives. Such attacks continued in
2024. New surveillance systems such as CCTV cameras and facial
recognition technologies pose a potential threat to individuals’
fundamental rights, especially freedom of expression. - Tax incentives for CSOs are extremely limited. A limited number of tax
incentives primarily benefit a small group of CSOs that hold public benefit
or tax-exempt status. The number of organizations granted this status
is very low, and the application process is bureaucratic, subjective,
and uncertain. - The amendment made in December 2024 to the Communiqué on
Granting Tax Exemption to Foundations (Serial No: 1) imposed additional
requirements and financial obligations for tax-exempt foundations to
maintain this status, putting many foundations at risk of losing their status.
The definitive provision in the communiqué, stating that transfers to the
economic enterprises established by a tax-exempt foundation to realize
its purpose would not be considered as purpose-intended expenditure,
makes it difficult for such foundations to meet the requirement of
“spending at least two-thirds of their annual income for intended
purposes within the year it is obtained.” The inclusion of the minimum
asset and annual income requirements sought in the tax exemption
application as conditions also for the maintaining statuses poses the risk of
loss of tax exemption status in cases where the targeted amount is not
reached due to incidental reasons. - The tax deduction rate for individual and corporate donations is very low
and applies only for donations and contributions made to CSOs
with tax-exempt or public benefit status. It results in only a small number
of organizations benefiting from public support through tax incentives,
leads to discrimination among CSOs. - There is no comprehensive legislation or national policy regulating CSOs’
access to public funds. Due to the lack of central coordination
and strategy, public support is provided in a fragmented manner through
internal directives that vary from institution to institution, with most
public funds transferred to CSOs working in certain activity areas,
while rights-based and monitoring organizations are often excluded.
The principles of transparency, equality, and accountability
are not systematically implemented in the planning and distribution
of public funds. - There is no common standard or oversight mechanism in determining
CSOs to benefit from public support, including protocol-based
cooperation. Selection and implementation processes are left to
the discretion of public administrations, and civil society is not included
in these processes. - Public institutions providing funds to CSOs carry out accountability,
monitoring, and evaluation processes according to in-house rules; there
is no robust regulation or common transparency standard. Evaluation
reports on the impact of funds are not publicly announced, and requests
for information on monitoring and evaluation processes are mostly
left unanswered by public institutions. - The majority of CSOs are unable to employ full-time paid staff.
High income tax and social security costs, combined with the economic
crisis and decrement of grants and funds, make it difficult to employ
qualified staff and reduce the appeal of working in civil society. - There is no legal framework aiming at the institutionalization of public
sector-CSO relations in Türkiye. The 12th Development Plan recognizes
civil society as an actor of development and emphasizes the importance
of cooperation. However, no concrete and effective measures are being
implemented in this regard. CSOs’ participation in policy-making
processes is not ensured through transparent and equitable methods;
especially for rights-based and critical CSOs, collaboration means with
the public sector are narrowing. Similarly, mechanisms for collaboration
and coordination between public sector and CSOs, and the development
of civil society are insufficient. - There is no standard, continuous, and accessible mechanism regulating
CSO participation in decision-making processes. The consultations
on draft legislations are carried out mostly in closed meetings with
the participation of CSOs, whose opinions and approaches aligned with
government policies. Except for limited examples such as consultations
for developing a legal framework on volunteering, effective consultation
practices are not common. CSO participation in legislation processes
is limited and not encouraged. Generally, the period between
the submission of a draft law and the adoption is extremely insufficient
for effective consultations. - Legislation regulating the right to information functions in a limited way
due to broad exceptions and discretionary power granted to public
institutions, and CSOs’ requests for information are mostly not met or are
responded incompletely and inadequately. - Although CSO participation in sectoral consultation and coordination
mechanisms is covered by the legislation, there is no general regulation
guaranteeing equal and qualified representation. Although means
of participation in municipalities are diverse, their quality also varies.
At the central level, the selection of CSOs is invitation-based,
and independent CSOs take a critical stance are excluded
from consultation processes. - Although the legislation treats CSOs as equal to other legal entities
in public tenders, there are no incentives or general regulations
for their participation. CSOs mostly need to sign a collaboration protocol
with the relevant ministry to provide public services; the absence of such
a protocol may hinder their activities. The reluctance of public
administrations to cooperate with rights-based CSOs and the lack of
an appeal mechanism in case of the termination of agreement restrict
CSOs’ role in public service.
